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The study presents a conceptual model of an aggregator who selectively pays 
farmers for altering farming practices in exchange for carbon offsets that the change in 
practices generates. Under the assumption that the offsets are stochastic and that the 
aggregator maximizes the sum of the offsets from the purchase that he/she can rightfully 
claim with a specified level of confidence subject to a budget constraint, we investigate 
the optimal discounting of expected carbon offsets. We use the model to estimate 
empirically the optimal discounting levels and costs for a hypothetical carbon purchasing 
project in the Upper Iowa River Basin. 
 




CARBON SEQUESTRATION IN AGRICULTURAL SOILS: 
DISCOUNTING FOR UNCERTAINTY 
Introduction 
Agricultural communities in the United States, Canada, and in a number of other 
countries have been excited about the prospect of farmers selling credits for carbon 
sequestered in cropland soils as greenhouse gas emission offsets. However, one of the big 
practical issues hindering the potential carbon sales is the uncertainty associated with the 
offsets. From a buyer’s point of view, future offsets are uncertain because carbon seques-
tration in agricultural soil is affected by a multitude of factors, many of which, such as 
weather and solar radiation, are inherently stochastic.  
While there is a growing soil science literature quantifying the uncertainty and its de-
terminants, the topic has received little attention in the economic analyses of carbon 
sequestration in cropland (Antle and McCarl 2002). Marland, McCarl, and Schneider 
(2001) mention the importance of the uncertainty in the context of proposed carbon 
accounting protocols that allow the credits only if there is at least 95 percent certainty 
about their magnitude. McCarl, Butt, and Kim (2004) also discuss the importance of the 
uncertainty and report the ensuing discounting of carbon offsets at the Chicago Climate 
Exchange at about 15 percent. Antle et al. (2003) propose a sampling procedure to reduce 
the uncertainty about carbon sequestered, yet neither study investigates how the presence 
of uncertainty alters economic agents’ decision making. This study attempts to fill in this 
gap by analyzing the mechanism of discounting carbon offsets for uncertainty. 
The focus of the current study is an aggregator, the economic agent vital for carbon 
trading involving agriculture, as large emitters of greenhouse gases usually need quanti-
ties of offsets much larger than any single farm can provide (Thomassin 2003; McCarl, 
Butt, and Kim 2004). In a carbon sequestration program administered by a government 
agency, the role of the aggregator is also important. In this case, the aggregator would 
assemble the offsets for reporting to interested parties such as those representing taxpay-
ers (for domestic programs) or to certify international organizations (for international 
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agreements). In any case, because of either market requirements or policy design stipula-
tions, the aggregator may be seriously concerned about the uncertainty of the offsets 
being delivered and may adjust behavior accordingly. 
This study presents a conceptual model of an aggregator selectively purchasing car-
bon offsets from farmers who switch farming practices to those that increase soil carbon 
content. We assume that the aggregator maximizes the sum of the offsets from the project 
that he/she can rightfully claim with a specified level of confidence, subject to a budget 
constraint. The model builds on the earlier work on cost-efficiency of achieving probabil-
istic pollution reduction targets (see, e.g., Shortle and Horan 2001). Empirical 
applications of the approach have been limited and almost exclusively focused on water 
quality (Milon 1987; Lichtenberg, Zilberman, and Bogen 1989; Bystrom 1998; Shortle et 
al. 1999; Bystrom, Andersson, and Gren 2000). In contrast, we build the model specifi-
cally to examine expected offset discounting arising because of uncertainty in the amount 
of carbon to be sequestered and the aggregator’s concern about confidence bounds on the 
total offset. We then apply the model to an empirical study of a hypothetical carbon 
sequestration project in the Upper Iowa River Basin. 
 
Conceptual Model 
Assume there are N farms indexed by i  that can potentially change their current 
farming practice to that of sequestering carbon. Let ix  denote the size of farm in acres 
and let ic  be the per acre opportunity cost of farmer changing practice (known to the 
aggregator). The farm i  per acre offset generated by the change in practice, ib , is sto-
chastic, and because of varying natural conditions (soils and landscape characteristics, 
cropping history, etc.), the offset distributions differ potentially from farm to farm, so that 
the ib ’s are jointly normally distributed,  
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where ( )i ib E b≡ , ( )ii iVar bσ ≡ , ( ),ij i jCovar b bσ ≡ , , 1,...,i j N= . 
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The aggregator is an economic agent who selectively offers farmers payments for 
switching the practices in exchange for carbon offsets that the change in practices gener-
ates. The aggregator has a budget, C , for these purchases, and for each farmer, i , the 
aggregator decides on the number of acres, ix , 0 i ix x≤ ≤ , on which to offer per acre 
payment ic . We assume that as long as a farmer is offered the payment, he/she switches 
the practices and the aggregator acquires the offset. 
Because of carbon market regulations (or those of the policy if the offset purchasing 
is done under auspices of a government-administered policy) the aggregator is concerned 
about the certainty of the total offset he/she is getting from the individual purchases. 
Specifically, we assume that the aggregator maximizes the amount of the aggregate offset 
that can be rightfully claimed with a confidence level α . The confidence level, α , is 
typically large and is greater than 0.5. Thus, the aggregator is maximizing the offset 
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fore, the deterministic equivalent of (2) is  
1 1 1
N N N
i i ij i j
i i j
B b x z x xα σ
= = =
= −∑ ∑∑ , 
where zα is the number such that { }Pr Z zα α≤ =  and ( )0,1Z N∼  (Charnes and Cooper 
1963). Note that if the aggregator is indifferent between falling below and exceeding the 
total offset target B , then 0.5α =  and 0zα = , meaning that aggregator is not making 
any adjustments to the uncertainty of the total offset and is simply maximizing the total 
expected value of the offsets purchased. However 0zα >  as long as 0.5α > , implying 
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that in this case the aggregator is always discounting the expected value of the total offset 






A z x xα σ
= =
≡ ∑∑ . (3) 
As expected intuitively, the magnitude of discounting increases with the confidence level 
α  and depends on the variability of offsets as described by their variance-covariance 
matrix.  
Mathematically, the aggregator’s problem is 
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− ≥∑ , the N  land constraints 0i ix x− ≥ , 
1,...,i N= , and the N  non-negativity constraints 0, 1,...,ix i N≥ = . 
Let *, 1,...,ix i N=  denote the solution to (4), *λ  be the Lagrangian multiplier of the 
budget constraint at the optimum, and *, 1,...,i i Nθ =  be the Lagrangian multipliers of the 
land constraints at the optimum. Then the first-order necessary conditions imply that all 
positive *ix  satisfy the equation 




i ij j ij i j i i
j i j
b z x x x cα σ σ λ θ
= = =
− − − =∑ ∑∑ . (5) 
Intuitively that means that at the optimum, the farm i  marginal per acre expected benefit 
ib  is being effectively adjusted by the amount 
* * * *
1 1 1
N N N
i ij j ij i j
j i j
a z x x xα σ σ
= = =
≡ ∑ ∑∑ .  
A couple of observations on the adjustment quantity, *ia , are worth discussing. First 
of all, the magnitudes of adjustments vary potentially from farm to farm and depend on 
the acreage enrolled on all the farms in the purchase. Secondly, as discussed earlier, if the 
aggregator is not concerned about whether the total realized offset is greater or smaller 
than its expected value, then * 0ia = , and no adjustment is taking place.  
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A third observation is that, in contrast with the total expected offset being always 
discounted (for 0.5α > ), the farm-specific per acre expected offsets may be either 
discounted or adjusted upward in obtaining the solution of the aggregator’s problem. 
Indeed, if the offsets from different farms are positively correlated ( 0,ij i jσ > ≠ ), then 
* 0ia >  for all i ; that is, per acre expected benefits are being discounted for all the farms 
in the purchase. However, if the offsets from some fields are negatively correlated, it is 
possible that the adjustment quantity *ia  is negative for some farms. To illustrate, con-
sider problem (4) with 2N = , ( )1 2, (2,1)b b = , ( ) ( )1 2, 1,1c c = , ( ) ( )1 2, 2,1x x = , 
11 22 1σ σ= = , 12 0.8σ = − , 2.5C = , and 0.99α = . The solution to this problem is given 
by ( )* *1 2, (1.5,1)x x = , with the total expected offset, * *1 1 2 2 4.00x b x b+ = , discounted by 
* 2.14A =  (see equation (3)). Yet on the per acre basis, only the expected offset of the 
first farm is discounted ( *1 1.77a = ), while that of the second farm is adjusted upward 
( *2 0.50a = − ). 
The next section presents an empirical application of the model to the analysis of the 
expected offset discounting for a hypothetical carbon purchase project in an agricultural 
production area in the United States. 
 
Empirical Application 
The empirical study region, as shown in Figure 1, is the Upper Iowa River Basin, de-
fined as Watershed 7080207 by the U.S. Geological Survey (Seaber, Kapinos, and Knapp 
1987). We investigate a hypothetical carbon project that pays farmers for retiring land 
from crop production and placing it under permanent grass cover in the Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP). We consider the uncertainty of offsets resulting from uncer-
tainty in weather, which is known to significantly affect carbon sequestration of CRP 
(Bruce et al. 1999; Follett et al. 2001; Paustian et al. 2001). 
The basic data for simulations come from the 1997 National Resources Inventory 
(NRI) (Nusser and Goebel 1997). Each NRI point is treated as representing a farm with a 
size equal to the number of acres represented by the point (the NRI expansion factor).  




FIGURE 1. Upper Iowa River Basin and the location of weather stations 
 
Some 346N =  NRI data points in the basin representing 693,400 acres of cropland are 
used for the analysis. The estimates of opportunity costs of retiring land from production, 
ic , come from Kurkalova, Burkart, and Secchi (2004), who followed the approach of 
Smith (1995) to measure the opportunity cost of land retirement via cropland cash rental 
rates. Given that the area is a part of prime agricultural land, it is not surprising that the 
costs of land retirement are very high, averaging over $130 per acre, as shown in Table 1. 
The empirical distributions of offsets, ib , are obtained at each data point using the 
EPIC (Environmental Policy Integrated Climate) simulation model (Williams 1990) as 
follows. First, we use EPIC to generate 50 random weather patterns from the distribution 
of weather patterns as recorded by the three weather stations in the region. Next, we run 
100 30-year simulations at each data point: 50 assuming conventional tillage practices  
Carbon Sequestration in Agricultural Soils: Discounting for Uncertainty / 7 
 
TABLE 1. Data summary, 346 NRI points 
 
and 50 assuming land retirement. Then, we compute 50 estimates of carbon sequestration 
potential as the difference in soil carbon content after 30 years under land retirement and 
that under tillage, divided by 30, each time pairing the simulations corresponding to the 
same weather pattern. Finally, the resulting 17,300 estimates (346 points times 50 
weather patterns) are used to compute sample means ib , variances iiσ , and covariances 
ijσ , , 1,...,346.i j =  The average of the expected per acre offsets in the sample, 1,587 kg 
C ha-1 yr-1, compares favorably with the estimates for this region (Follett et al. 2001; 
Paustian et al. 2001). Summary statistics on the data used in the simulations are given in 
Table 1.  
Given the data on ic , ib , iiσ , and ijσ , , 1,...,346i j = , the aggregator’s problem (4) is 
solved for three levels of budget C, $5 million, $10 million, and $15 million, correspond-
ing to enrollment in CRP of 5.9 percent, 11.4 percent, and 16.8 percent of the cropland 
under consideration, respectively. For each of the budget levels, three confidence levels, 
α = 0.90, 0.95, and 0.99, are analyzed. For comparison purposes, we also report results 




To simplify comparisons across budgets and confidence levels, the estimated ex-
pected offset discounting is reported in Table 2 in relative terms, that is, as a percentage 









Expected carbon offset  
(mt C per acre) ib  0.014 0.643 2.004 
Cost of retiring land from 
production ($ per acre) ic  81.7 130.5 188.6 
NRI expansion acres ix  100 2004 3200 
Variance of carbon offset  
(mt C squared per acre 
squared) iiσ  0.030*10-3 2.493*10-3 86.055*10-3
  
TABLE 2. Simulations results 
Budget (Million $)  5 10 15 
Confidence Level, α  0.50 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.50 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.50 0.90 0.95 0.99 
Carbon claimable             
(1,000 mt) 61.8 60.0 59.5 58.5 109.3 106.1 105.3 103.9 152.6 147.5 146.3 144.2
Total expected carbon 
discount (%) 0 2.9 3.8 4.7 0 2.5 3.3 4.4 0 2.9 3.5 4.7 
Per acre expected carbon 
discount (%)                         
   Minimum 0 0.9 1.2 2.0 0 1.1 1.5 -0.5 0 0.1 -0.1 -0.4 
   Average 0 2.8 3.5 5.0 0 2.5 3.2 4.2 0 2.7 3.2 4.5 
   Maximum 0 11.6 14.9 17.5 0 9.5 12.2 17.2 0 13.1 15.1 18.8 
Break-even carbon price  
($ per mt) 80.9 83.3 84.0 85.5 91.5 94.3 95.0 96.2 98.3 101.7 102.5 104.0
Payment for discounting 
(% of budget) 0 3.6 4.7 6.5 0 3.4 4.3 5.9 0 4.2 5.1 6.9 
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∑ , and the per acre expected offset discount is reported as *i ia b . The results 
of estimation suggest that weather uncertainty as simulated is consistent with the total 
expected carbon discounting in the range of 2.5 percent to 4.7 percent. Interestingly, the 
relative magnitude of discounting is fairly consistent across budgets for a given confidence 
level. For example, when offset target is to be achieved with the confidence level of 
α = 0.99, the total expected offset discounting was found to vary from 4.4 to 4.7 percent.  
As expected from the simple numerical example presented earlier, the per acre ex-
pected offset adjustments vary widely with the minima being negative for some budgets 
and confidence levels and the maxima being as high as almost 19 percent. Nevertheless, 
the average per acre discounts are found to be close to the total expected offset discounts. 
Results of estimation suggest that purchasing carbon offsets from farmers with land 
enrolled in a CRP-like program is profitable for the aggregator at prices beginning at 
$80.9 per metric ton of carbon offset. Note, however, that because the discounting 
increases with the increasing confidence level, the higher total offset confidence levels 
require higher break-even offset prices. This implies that economic feasibility of seques-
tration in agricultural soils should be addressed with the confidence levels taken into 
account. For example, if the offset price is set at $102, purchasing 0.147 million metric 
tons of offset claimable with the confidence level of 90 percent is profitable in this area. 
But if the confidence level for the offsets were to increase to 95 percent, purchasing that 
quantity of offsets in this area is no longer profitable. Thus, ignoring the confidence 
levels may lead to unrealistically optimistic estimates of economic feasibility of carbon 
sequestration in agricultural soils.  
To monetize the effect of offset discounting in an alternative way, we estimate the 






B b x A
=
= −∑  with a specified confidence level as opposed to purchasing the same 
offset *B  with the confidence level α = 0.50, which does not involve discounting. These 
additional expenses expressed as a percentage of the budget are reported as “payment for 
discounting” in Table 2. We found that a sizable share of the budget, from 3.4 to 6.9 
percent, may be required to make sure that the total offset is claimable with the specified 
confidence level.  




The study presents a model of discounting expected carbon sequestration offsets for 
uncertainty and estimates that weather variability is consistent with up to 5 percent 
discounting of expected offsets from retiring land from agricultural production in the 
Upper Iowa River Basin for the budget levels of $5 to $15 million and offset confidence 
levels of 90 to 99 percent. We found that nearly 7 percent of the budget may be used 
exclusively to ensure the specified confidence levels of the offsets. The results under-
score the importance of incorporating uncertainty and offset confidence levels in the 
economic assessments of carbon sequestration potential of agricultural soils. Ignoring the 
uncertainty may lead to overly optimistic conclusions about economically feasible carbon 
sequestration levels. 
While the numerical estimates of the optimal discounting levels and costs may not be 
immediately transferable to other regions and farming practices, the modeling framework 
presented can be applied to study the effects of other sources of offset uncertainty. A 
particularly fascinating extension of this work would be to model and estimate the 
discounting due to uncertainty about the permanence of the offsets. In this case, the 
assumption on normality of the distributions of farm-level offsets would probably have to 
be replaced with that of a more suitable distribution, thus requiring alternative derivation 
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